Hastings International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 34
Number 1 Winter 2011

Article 4

1-1-2011

Health, Human Rights, and Violence against
Women and Girls: Broadly Redefining Affirmative
State Duties after Opuz v. Turkey
Cheryl Hanna

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_international_comparative_law_review
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Cheryl Hanna, Health, Human Rights, and Violence against Women and Girls: Broadly Redefining Affirmative State Duties after Opuz v.
Turkey, 34 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 127 (2011).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol34/iss1/4

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.

Health, Human Rights, and Violence
Against Women and Girls: Broadly
Redefining Affirmative State Duties
After Opuz v. Turkey
By CHERYL HANNA*
As international lawyers, I believe we are called upon to give
normative content to these general statements of the 'right to
health' by elaboration and by specification. Most of us are more
accustomed to the concept of the right to access to health care,
rather than the right to health.... Applying this criterion of
equality in health status to the right to health, we can only conclude
that there are serious failures in the provision of equal health status
to all the populations of the world. We have failed to provide equal
health status for various categories of persons in both developed
and developing countries. ... We in the developed and developing
countries have to reorder our priorities on issues of health. That
means that there are a great many things we can do that do not
depend on cure but on prevention.

- VirginiaLearf

Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. Cheryl Hanna is a Professor of Law at
Vermont Law School. A graduate of Kalamazoo College and Harvard Law School,
her scholarship and teaching focus on Constitutional Law and gender issues. Her
work involving violence against women and state obligations has been widely cited,
including by the United States Supreme Court. She is the co-author of Domestic
Violence and the Law Theory and Practice. The author thanks Clare Cragan and

Cheryl Stevens for their research assistance, Ginny Burnham for her continued
support, Emily Slagle, and Shivani Ballesteros for editing assistance. She also thanks
the editors at the HastingsInternational& ComparativeLawReview for a wonderful

symposium and the chance to participate in this conference. This article is dedicated
to my good friend and colleague Virginia Leary, who dedicated her life to ending
human suffering. It is up to the rest of us to continue her work.
1. Virginia Leary et al., Health, Human Rights and InternationalLaw, 82 AM.
INT'L L. PROC. 122, 122, 124 (1988).
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I. Introduction
In 1988, Professor Virginia Leary called upon lawyers to
articulate that the right to health was a basic human right. She
referenced the definition of World Health Organization Constitution,
suggesting that everyone has the right to the highest obtainable
standard of physical and mental health regardless of race, religion,
political belief, economic or social condition.! She then called on
states to affirmatively prevent human suffering that was within their
control.3 Nearly a quarter century later, we find ourselves still
struggling to fulfill her appeal. In this article, originally presented at
Health as a Human Right: The Global Option, a symposium
sponsored by the HastingsInternational& ComparativeLaw Review,
I humbly try to carry on Professor Leary's work by specifically
elaborating on what the "right to health" means in the context of
physical and sexual violence against women and girls.
To that end, this paper makes two assertions. First, while there
has been tremendous progress in our understanding of how male
violence against women and girls undermines gender equality and
impacts their right to autonomy and full citizenship, the most
fundamental and basic consequence of such violence - physical and
mental injury - is often overlooked. Both legal scholarship and
arguments justifying affirmative state intervention to end privately
imposed violence often fail to address these injuries. Yet, genderbased violence is one of the most widespread public health problems
in the world.! Therefore, the right to health ought to be included
2. Id. at 122.
3. See, e.g., id at 124 ("For example, decreasing tobacco intake, changing our
food standards, wearing helmets when we are riding motorcycles are environmental
changes that emphasize prevention rather than cure. And we can undertake these
changes without great economic development in the country.").
4. This fact became particularly evident to me as a co-author of one of the
leading American casebooks on violence against women. In the first edition, written
in 2000, there was almost no discussion of the consequences of gendered violence on
female health. In the second edition, in 2008, we added a chapter on the relationship
between domestic violence and reproductive and sexual health. It was not until 2010,
in preparation for our third edition, had there been sufficient development in the
field to expand that chapter to include the relationship between gendered violence
and health is general. See generally ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, CHERYL HANNA,
JUDITH G. GREENBERG & CLARE DALTON, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LAW:
THEORY AND PRACTICE (Foundation Press, 2nd ed. 2008).
5. See MARUKE VELZEBO ET AL., VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: THE HEALTH
SECTOR RESPONDS, at xi (2003), available at www.paho.org/englishlad/ge/VAWHealthSectorResponds.pdf.
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within legal arguments justifying affirmative state duties to intervene
into private relationships. By expanding our understanding of human
rights and affirmative state duties to include explicit concerns about
female health, we provide a more complete articulation of a rightsbased approach to elimination of gendered violence, thereby
honoring principles of equality within a broader human rights
framework. This first assertion is hardly controversial and merely
bears witness to the already extensive empirical research that
documents how male violence compromises the physical, sexual, and
mental health of women and girls.
In contrast to my first assertion, my second assertion is likely to
provoke some debate. While few would question that states have an
affirmative duty to implement policies geared at ending male violence
against females, many would question whether such policies should
include mandated interventions that are contrary to a woman's choice
to preference her privacy over her health or safety. It is here where
two human rights - the right to health and the right to family
autonomy and privacy - seemingly conflict. Of course, this conflict is
hardly one of first impression, advocates for abused women have
been debating where this line ought to be drawn for nearly two
decades' just as health advocates have struggled with the question of
when mandatory public health interventions should yield to privacy
concerns.7 To a great extent, there are no easy answers to this
question.
Yet, Opuz v. Turkey," recently decided by the European Court of
6. See Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic
Violence: Can Law Help End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 1487 (2008); Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 Iowa L.
Rev. 741 (2007); Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose:Mandated Victim Participation
in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1996); Margaret E.
Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies, and Reclaiming Domestic
Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 1107 (2009); G. Kristian Miccio, A House
Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the Conservatization of the
Battered Women's Movement, 42 Hous. L. REV. 237, 239, 264-71 (2005); Jennie Suk,
CnminalLaw Comes Home, 116 YALE L. J. 2 (2006).
7. See Leary, supra note 1, at 130 ("The person's right to privacy can be
infringed if information about HIV test results or the fact that testing was sought or
required is disclosed without the person's authorization or without a clear public
health benefit. Human rights are best respected by using the least restrictive, least
intrusive measures available to accomplish specific public health objectives.").
8. Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. 130 (2009), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&high
light=33401/02&sessionid=61785011&skin=hudoc-en.
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Human Rights, articulates a clear and simple standard to guide state
actors in deciding whether mandatory interventions into specific
relationships promote or compromise human rights. When assessing
whether a nation has violated its duties under the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms ("European Convention"), the Court required states to
intervene if authorities knew or should have known there was a risk
to the life of an individual by a third party.' The Court created a list
of factors to use when assessing the State's actions that uniquely
apply to private violence perpetrated by intimate partners, including
the nature of the victim's injuries and the continuing threat to her
health and safety."o Here, the Court specifically articulates how the
preservation of health requires positive state intervention, even if it
arguably comprises another human rights principle. This articulation
shows the Court's willingness to err on the side of ensuring physical
and mental integrity rather than the more conceptually amorphous
concept of privacy.
It is my assertion that states, including the United States and
state and local officials, should adopt the standard set forth in Opuz
when resolving the conflict between the right to health and the right
to privacy in the context of intimate violence. Thus, as a practical
matter, in individual cases the State must proceed with positive
intervention regardless of whether the victim implicitly or explicitly
requests otherwise. This approach, which is hardly radical, leaves
significant discretion to state decision-makers over the
appropriateness of positive state intervention in individual cases and
thereby requires a case-by-case analysis that takes into account the
victim's health, along with other concerns.
This is precisely the kind of specific articulation of the right to
health that Professor Leary urged a quarter of a century ago. By
adopting the Opuz approach, states give life to the right to health by
implementing affirmative policies that consider an individual's
physical and mental state while delicately balancing other concerns.
The Opuz approach also incorporates the principle of equality within
the right to health that Professor Leary urges by recognizing that
women and girls have physically and mentally suffered because of
state indifference, if not state perpetuation, of gendered violence.

9. Id.
10. Id. [ 138.
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Finally, by requiring positive state intervention when there is a
serious future risk to health, the Opuz approach is one of prevention.
We may never be able to cure those men who perpetuate physical and
sexual violence against women, but we can prevent them from doing
future harm by limiting access to their victims. The only way to do
that in many cases is for the State to intervene by assuming control
over the offender. While that may make many uncomfortable in light
of concerns over privacy and autonomy, such an approach is
necessary if we are to take the right to health for women and girls
seriously.
II. Bearing Witness to the Consequences of Male Violence
on Female Health
In bearing witness to the impact of intimate partner abuse on
women's health, I begin with two thoughts. First, there is rich and
extensive data describing how intimate partner violence results in illhealth, but little discussion on how ill-health affects a woman's legal
status and participation in legal processes. Thus, legal scholars have
an enormous opportunity, as well as a responsibility, to more
accurately understand the relationship between ill-health, social and
economic conditions, and the law. Second, and perhaps more
importantly, all of the available data suggests that intimate partner
violence is among the greatest preventable health risks that women
and girls face. State indifference or inaction to curb such abuse is
therefore unconscionable. This is precisely the kind of failure in the
equal provisions for health status that Professor Leary cautioned
against. Yet, rather than interpret a lack of progress cynically, we
should view it optimistically by recognizing the potential that exists
for improving the health of women and girls by implementing policies
aimed at ending gendered violence.
There have been numerous reports, both domestic and
international, documenting the health consequences of male violence
against females. Among the most comprehensive is the 2005 World
Health Organization's (WHO) Multi-country Study on Women's
The study
Health and Domestic Violence Against Women."
analyzed data collected from over 24,000 women, representing
diverse cultural, geographical and urban/rural settings in ten
11. See CLAUDIA GARCiA-MORENO ET AL., WHO MULTI-COUNTRY STUDY ON
WOMEN'S HEALTH AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (2005), available at

http://www.who.int/gender/violence/who

multicountry-study/en/.
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countries: Bangladesh, Brazil, Ethiopia, Japan, Peru, Namibia,
Samoa, Serbia and Montenegro (at the time a unified state),
Thailand, and the United Republic of Tanzania. 1 2 The emphasis of
the study was on violence perpetrated by intimate partners. Below
are its key findings:
Physical health:
In the majority of settings, women who had ever experienced
partner violence were significantly more likely to report poor or
very poor health than women who had never experienced partner
violence. Ever-abused women were also more likely to have had
problems walking and carrying out daily activities, pain, memory
loss, dizziness, and vaginal discharge in the four weeks prior to the
interview. An association between recent ill-health and lifetime
experience of violence suggests that the physical effects of violence
may last a long time after the actual violence has ended, or that
violence over time may have a cumulative effect.
Mental health and suicide:
In all settings, women who had ever experienced physical or sexual
violence, or both, by an intimate partner reported significantly
higher levels of emotional distress and were more likely to have
thought of suicide, and to have attempted suicide, than women who
had never experienced partner violence.14
Reproductive health and violence during pregnancy:
In the majority of settings, ever-pregnant women who had
experienced partner physical or sexual violence, or both were
significantly more likely to report having had at least one induced

abortion than women who had never experienced partner violence.
Similar patterns were found for miscarriage, but the strength of the
association was less. . . . Between one quarter and one half of
women physically abused in pregnancy were kicked or punched in
the abdomen. In all sites, over 90% were abused by the biological

father of the child the woman was carrying. The majority of those
beaten during pregnancy had experienced physical
before.. . ."

violence

This study confirms what other studies found: victims of intimate

12. Id. at xii, available at http://www.who.int/gender/violence/who-multicountry
study/Introduction-Chapterl-Chapter2.pdf.
13. Id. at xv.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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partner abuse suffer ill-health effects at a greater rate than nonvictims."
The World Bank estimates that one to five years of life are lost in
women ages fifteen to forty-four through death or disability resulting
from domestic violence." That is "more than [are lost] to breast
cancer, cervical cancer, obstructed labor, heart disease, AIDS,
respiratory infections, motor vehicle accidents or war."" Women and
girls suffer a range of injuries at the hands of violent men: bruises,
cuts, scrapes, sprains, burns, broken teeth and bones, dislocations,
16. See PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FULL
REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
SURVEY 25-26 (Nov. 2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubssum/183781.htm; Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Integration on
the Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective: Violence Against

Women: The Due Diligence Standard as a Tool for the Elimination of Violence
Against Women: Report of the Special Rapporteuron violence against women, its
causes and consequences, U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 60,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/61 (Jan. 20, 2006) (by Yakin Ertirk), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/45377afb0.html; see generally WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, WORLD REPORT ON VIOLENCE AND HEALTH 100-01 (Krug et al.,

eds., 2002) [hereinafter WHO], available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications
/2002/9241545615eng.pdf (for a comprehensive review of the relationship between
intimate partner abuse and women's health).
17. See Rebecca Adams, Violence Against Women and InternationalLaw: The
FundamentalRight to State Protection from Domestic Violence, 20 N.Y. INT'L L.
REV. 57 (2007) (for an excellent overview of recent international data on domestic
violence and a comprehensive list of resources); see also Lori L. Heise, Adrienne
Germain & Jacqueline Pitanguy, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: THE HIDDEN HEALTH
BURDEN (World Bank Publications 1994); Sarah Venis & Richard Horton, Violence
Against Women: A GlobalBurden,359 LANCET 1172, 1172 (2002) (maintaining that
domestic violence causes as much death and ill health in women ages fifteen to forty-

four as cancer); Nieves Rico, Gender-Based Violence: A Human Rights Issue, 16
MUJER Y DESSARROLLO [WOMEN AND DEVELOPMENT]
26, (United Nations,
CEPAL, Women and Development Unit 1989) (June 1997), available at
http://www.eclac.cl /publicaciones/xml/3/4743/1cl957i.pdf (stressing that women can
lose years of their lives as a result of death or illness caused by domestic violence or

rape).
18. See Venis & Horton, supra note 17, at 1172 (explaining that domestic
violence is a greater cause of death in women ages fifteen to forty-four than malaria
and traffic accidents combined); see also CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
HEALTH, LOOKING TOWARD 2000-AN ASSESSMENT OF HEALTH STATUS AND
HEALTH SERVICES 166 (1999), available at http://www.ct.gov/dph/cwp/view.asp?a=

3130&q=389678 (concluding that domestic violence is the leading cause of injury to
women); see generally Yvette Lopez, Sleeping with the Enemy: Mexico and
Domestic Violence, Out for a Rude A wakening or Rising in Time?, 25 WOMEN'S
RTs. L. REP. 1, 1 (2003) (claiming that domestic violence is the leading cause of injury
and death in women).
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internal injuries, wounds from knives or guns, loss of sight, hearing,
smell, taste, and touch, and permanent disfigurement or brain
damage.19 They also suffer from higher rates of drug and alcohol
addiction.20 In addition, reproductive health consequences as a result
of sexual abuse include HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases,
vaginal bleeding or infection, fibroids, decreased sexual desire, genital
irritation, pain during intercourse, chronic pelvic pain, and urinary
tract infections.21 Unintended pregnancies, miscarriages, and induced
abortions are also experienced at higher rates for abused females
when compared to non-abused females.22
While the WHO study examines physical, mental, and
reproductive health consequences of intimate partner violence, the
legal literature in the U.S. on the effects of abuse has tended to
emphasize the mental health consequences of violence. This is in part
because a victim's mental state is often a central question in various
legal contexts, such as the concept of "self-defense," when women kill
their abusers. Further, the public is obsessed with the question of
why women do not leave abusive relationships; ill mental health is an
easy, albeit grossly inadequate and usually patently wrong answer.
I do not mean to suggest that women and girls do not suffer
significant mental injury when they are abused. Indeed, as one
woman from Serbia and Montenegro said in the WHO study,
"[e]motional abuse is worse. You can become insane when you are
constantly humiliated and told that you are worthless, that you are
nothing."23 Yet, the unintended consequence of the focus on mental
health has been to over-pathologize women and girls by attributing
their otherwise rational behavior to things like "battered women
syndrome" and to under-appreciate the relevance of poor physical
19. Deborah Epstein et al., Transforming Aggressive Prosecution Policies:
Prioritizing Victims' Long-Term Safety in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence
Cases, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 465, 473 (2003)
20. See Evan Stark, Nicholson v. Williams Revisited- When Good People Do
Bad Things, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 691, 711 (2005) (indicating that battered women are
more likely to abuse drugs and alcohol, have a psychotic break, report depression or
attempt suicide); see also Kelsey S. Barnes, The Economics of Violence: Why
Freedom from Domestic Violence Must Be Treated as a Developmental Right in
InternationalLaw, 6 U. MIAMI Y.B. INT'L L. 97, 120 (1997) (revealing that victims of
domestic abuse are fifteen and nine times more likely to abuse alcohol and drugs,
respectively, than women who are not abused).
21. GARCIA-MORENO ET AL., supra note 11, at 101-02.
22. Id.
23. WHO, supra note 16, at 9.
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and reproductive health to the choices and behaviors of victims.
To the extent that the law does focus on physical health, its
tendency is to locate a specific injury as the basis for legal
intervention. It is the black eye or the broken arm that serves as the
basis for granting a restraining order or initiating prosecution. Yet,
according to the WHO's Report on Health and Violence, for
example, "[i]njury... is not the most common physical outcome of
partner abuse. More common are 'functional disorders' - a host of
ailments that frequently have no identifiable medical cause, such as
irritable bowel syndrome, fibromyalgia, gastrointestinal disorders and
various chronic pain syndromes. Studies consistently link such
disorders with a history of physical or sexual abuse."2 4 We know very
little as to how ailments such as chronic pain or digestive disorders
can hinder a victim's ability to meaningfully participate in legal
processes, including her ability to attend court, communicate
effectively with legal counsel, and request appropriate remedies. We
fail to fully appreciate how to compensate victims for these long-term
ailments, or how such conditions may affect a woman's ability to
parent or work.
We do know that there is a direct relationship between ill-health
and the ability of women and girls to support themselves and their
families. According to the WHO, "[w]omen who have been abused
also experience reduced physical functioning, more physical
symptoms and a greater number of days in bed than non-abused
women." 25 This observation is consistent with other studies that
document that ill-health suffered by abused women and girls reduce
their ability to participate in the economy and realize economic
independence.26
24. Id. at 102.
25. Id.
26. See John E. Matejkovic, Which Suit Would You Like? The Employer's
Dilemma in Dealing with Domestic Violence, 33 CAP. U.L. REV. 309, 311 (2004)
(asserting that one-quarter to one-half of female victims lose their jobs due to
domestic violence); Jennifer M. Gaines, Comment, Employer Liability for Domestic
Violence in the Workplace: Are Employers Walking a Tightrope Without a Safety
Net?, 31 TEX. TECH L. REV. 139, 143 (2000) (noting that domestic violence decreases
productivity in the workplace and increases costs to employers); Sushma Kapoor,
Domestic Violence Against Women and Girls,INNOCENTI DIG. No. 6,13 (June 2000),
available at http://unicef-icdc.org/publications/pdf/digest6e.pdf
(illustrating that
domestic violence has caused a reported thirty percent of abused women to lose their
jobs in the U.S. and that in Chile, abused women earn less than one-half in average
wages compared to those women who do not suffer from violence at home).
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Thus, in looking at the issue of violence and health, I am struck
with the sense that we legal scholars have been missing something.
While our medical colleagues have done tremendous work in
documenting the health effects of partner violence, to a large extent,
legal scholars have been unsure exactly how physical and
reproductive health, in particular, ought to factor into law. But, if we
start with the premise that the right to health, as defined in Professor
Leary's remarks, is a basic human right, then we can begin to
understand how including health in our arguments about affirmative
state duties to end gendered violence can provide another perspective
and another tool to persuade the powers that be to prioritize
eliminating gendered violence.
III. Opuz v. Turkey: Giving Meaning to the Right to Health
I start with the premise that states should have an affirmative
obligation to implement policies, procedures, and programs that
address gendered violence. Every major international human rights
instrument, beginning with the United Nations Charter, prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sex, and every major human rights
instrument ratified after the Charter guarantees the right to equality
before the law.27 The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights,28 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),29 the U.N. Declaration
on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, 0 and the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading

27. See U.N. Charter art. 55 (demonstrating a commitment to equal rights by
respecting everyone's "fundamental freedoms"); see also Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 2, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N.
Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) (declaring that human rights protections are meant to
apply to everyone without discrimination); International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 1057 U.N.T.S. 407 (reiterating the U.N.'s goal of
achieving equal rights without distinctions of race, sex, religion, etc.).
28. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 1057
U.N.T.S. 407 (for reiteration of the U.N.'s goal of achieving equal rights without
distinctions of race, sex, religion, etc.).
29. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Dec. 18,1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
30. See Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res.
48/104, arts. 1-2, 4, 85th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (Dec. 20, 1993)
(admitting that violence against women leads to domination and discrimination of
women by men).
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Treatment or Punishment" are among the many human rights
documents that support affirmative state duties to end gendered
violence.
In addition, many of these documents also include the right to
health. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
includes "the right to a standard of living adequate for ... health and
well-being."32 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights requires states to uphold "the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health."3 3 The Constitution of the WHO says that the enjoyment of
the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental
rights of every human being without distinction as to race, religion,
political belief, economic or social condition.
While some countries, including the U.S., have not formally
ratified documents like CEDAW and have refused to recognize
affirmative state obligations to intervene to protect women and
children from private violence, 4 there is no disagreement among legal
scholars that states should undertake positive action, even if not
bound to do so by domestic or international law. No informed legal
scholar or advocate of good will would deny that all states should, as
the WHO recommends, "[e]stablish, implement and monitor action
plans to address violence against women, including violence by
intimate partners."35 In other words, there is no legitimate argument
to be made that violence against women perpetrated in private
settings like the home, is immune from public responses.
Furthermore, there is little disagreement that at the policy level,
states at the very least should have policies and programs geared at
prevention, that they should monitor violence against women, and
that they should provide individual redress of private violence
through the judicial system. While there are policy questions over
31. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984),
available atwww2.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/cat.pdf.
32. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 25, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
33. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), art. 12, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16 1966).
34. See, e.g., Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005); DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
35. GARCIA-MORENO ET AL., supranote 11, at xvii.
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which exact policies and procedures may be most effective in various
contexts, international norms firmly dictate against state inaction.
Furthermore, there is little disagreement among scholars and
advocates that when a victim requests assistance from the State to
preserve her health, safety, and welfare from a violent partner, that
there ought to be some reasonable response. Exactly what that
intervention should actually be is subject to reasonable debate, such
as whether arrest policies should be mandatory or discretionary.
The much harder question is what to do when the State has
knowledge that a woman's right to health and right to equality are
being compromised but the woman herself does not want state
intervention - perhaps because she is fearful of the abuser or fearful
of the consequences, or because she simply distrusts the State.
Nevertheless, the woman either implicitly or explicitly expresses that
she does not welcome the state intervention that is available to her. It
is this question that is most difficult for both theorists and
practitioners to answer. That is especially true in the context of
criminal intervention, but is central to other issues such as mandatory
reporting by medical professionals and issuing of mandatory stayaway orders. Therefore, the simple question is this: Under what
conditions should the State preference the right to health and equality
over the right of privacy and autonomy?
This was precisely the question presented in the case of Opuz v.
Turkey, recently decided by the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR). In Opuz, the ECHR found Turkey to be in violation of its
obligations to protect women from domestic violence, and for the first
time held that gender-based violence is a form of discrimination
under the European Convention. This is the first time this particular
court has elaborated on the nature of state obligations with respect to
violence in the family and held domestic violence to be an issue of
public interest that demands effective state action." Thus, while the
case has only precedential application to those countries that are
signatories to the European Convention, it has enormous intellectual
value to any local, state, or national jurisdiction that has inevitably
struggled with the question of when state intervention ought to be
mandatory.
The applicant, Nahide Opuz, claimed that Turkey had failed to
36. Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. J1 126, 139, 145 (2009),
availableat http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.aspitem=1&portal=hbkm&action
=html&highlight=opuz%20%7C%20turkey&sessionid=62302790&skin=hudoc-en.
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protect her and her mother from Nahide's husband. At least seven
times, Nahide and her mother filed assault and death threat reports
with the authorities, citing grievous injuries that included severe
beatings and even stabbings. In a particularly horrifying incident,
Nahide's husband hit both her and her mother with a car while they
were walking on the sidewalk.37 These injuries rendered Nahide and
her mother unable to work for weeks at a time.38 The violence
perpetrated by Nahide's husband was significant, severe, and
unyielding.
However, while Nahide and her mother often withdrew their
complaints after reporting the violence to the authorities, on other
occasions, the court dismissed cases for lack of evidence.3 9 Thus,
Turkey did little to gain control over Nahide's husband. Finally,
while in the process of moving her daughter away, Nahide's husband
shot her mother who died instantly.40 Although convicted of murder,
his sentence was reduced to fifteen years. The court reasoned that
Nahide's mother had provoked Nahide's husband by leading Nahide
into an immoral life, and he shot her trying to defend his honor and
children.41
Nahide alleged that Turkey's actions and inactions violated three
articles of the European Convention: the Right to Life under Article
2; the Right to be Free from Torture under Article 3; and the Right to
be Free from Gender Discrimination under Article 14. The basis of
her argument was "that domestic violence was tolerated by the
authorities and society and that the perpetrators of domestic violence
enjoyed impunity. ,42
The government of Turkey denied these claims, and instead
submitted that Nahide and her mother had contributed to the
immunity enjoyed by Nahide's husband because they had withdrawn
the complaints. 43 Because "the criminal acts in question had not
resulted in sickness or unfitness for work for ten days or more," under
Turkey's criminal code, Turkey was dependent on the complaining

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. 23.
Id. 25.
Id. 12.
Id. 54.
Id.
56-57.
Id. T 119.
Id.
122-23.
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witness to proceed." Turkey claimed that there was no evidence that
Nahide's husband had exerted pressure on Nahide or her mother to
withdraw the complaints.45 And, perhaps most importantly, Turkey
claimed that "the authorities could not be expected to separate the
applicant and her husband and convict the latter while they were
living together as a family, as this would amount to a breach of their
rights under Article 8 of the European Convention."" Article 8 of
the European Convention states that
1. everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life,
his home and his correspondence;
2. there shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others.47
Thus, Turkey's defense was based on two concepts: privacy, as
explicitly articulated in Article 8, and, implicitly, on Nahide's
autonomy, which she asserted freely when she no longer cooperated
with the State. The Court rejected Turkey's defense and instead
found that it had violated the three articles of the European
Convention.
1. Right to Life
Article 2 of the European Convention states that, "[e]veryone's
right to life shall be protected by law." 48 The Court determined that
under this article nations are "not only to refrain from the intentional
and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to
safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction[,]" thus establishing
an affirmative duty to protect its citizens.49 When assessing whether a

44. Id. 123.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
art. VIII, Dec. 10, 1948, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
48. Id. at art. II.
49. Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. 128 (2009), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&high
light=33401/02&sessionid=61785011&skin=hudoc-en.
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nation has violated this duty to a citizen, the Court asks whether the
authorities under the State "knew or ought to have known at the time
of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an
identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third
party" and, further, whether the State "failed to take measures within
the scope of [its] powers which, judged reasonably, might have been
expected to avoid that risk.""o Importantly, the Court framed this
discussion in the context of domestic violence, recognizing that it
often includes psychological as well as physical abuse, and takes place
in homes often hidden from the public sector. The Court also
recognized that domestic violence is a problem facing all nations, and,
therefore, the right to life in a domestic violence context carries
greater weight than in other contexts." The Court concluded that
Turkey failed to adequately protect Nahide's mother based both on
laws that could not deter unlawful behavior, as well as the authorities'
failure to use existing laws to prevent the harm.5 2 It is important to
note that this article applied only to Nahide's mother, and not to
Nahide herself, because she had survived Nahide's husband's abuse.
2. Right to Be Free from Torture

Article 3 of the European Convention states that, "[n]o one shall
be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment." In order for Article 3 to apply, the harm to the victim
must reach a minimum level of severity." The Court did not quantify
the level of severity; rather, it examined the specific circumstances of
the case to decide if the violence against Nahide and her mother had
reached the level of torture.54 The European Convention requires
member states to "ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are
not subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment, including such ill-treatment administered by private
individuals."" Also, the Court emphasized that Article 3 will carry
more weight, or will more likely apply, if the victims are of a
56
vulnerable class of persons.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. 129.
Id. 1130.
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Id. 159.
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Nahide fell into the category of a "vulnerable individual" as a
repeat victim of domestic violence who felt helpless because of the
inadequate protection the State offered." Thus, she was vulnerable
not because of some inherent psychological condition, but because
her sense of helplessness was rationally based on the State's inaction.
The State violated Article 3 not only because it should have
recognized Nahide as a vulnerable person given the nature of the
crimes, but also because it blamed her for not cooperating or
withdrawing her complaints. The Court concluded that Turkey
violated Article 3" by failing to protect women from extreme
domestic violence, thereby abdicating its duty to its citizens and
condoning "torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.""
3. Right to Be Free from Gender Discrimination

Article 14 of the European Convention states that, "[t]he
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention
shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex,
race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or
other status."a In deciding whether Turkey violated this article of the
European Convention, the Court used a similar balancing test as used
by the U.S. Supreme Court, allowing discriminating practices only if
the State can justify the reason for treating classes differently.' Once
the party contesting the State's discriminatory action makes a prima
facie case, the burden shifts to the government to justify its policy,
law, or actions in furtherance of that law or policy.62 In gender
discrimination cases, statistical evidence that women are impacted to
a greater degree is generally sufficient to shift the burden to the
government.63
Translating the right to equal treatment to the context in this
case, the Court held that a "[s]tate's failure to protect women against
domestic violence breaches their right to equal protection of the law
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. 160.
Id. T 171.
Id. 159.
Id. 177.
Id. J 183-91.
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and that this failure does not need to be intentional."6 The Court
could not point to specific instances where women were classified
differently under the law, but rather focused on the general treatment
and disposition of the authorities towards women." Turkey could not
passively allow domestic violence to occur based on archaic norms
that such violence is "a family matter" or needed to express a man's
honor.6 The Court held Turkey violated Article 14 because its laws
were inadequate to treat women and men equally, and, more
importantly, the special context of domestic violence did not require a
woman to exhaust all remedies on her own before the State could
take action.
While Opuz has been hailed by international legal scholars as
one of the most important decisions to date regarding affirmative
duties to end gendered violence,6 the decision is fairly measured and
pragmatic. It draws on prior precedent that had already established
that a government is responsible for intervening in cases of private
abuse,69 and is one in a number of cases that has rejected the
argument that privacy considerations should override those of bodily
harm in private relationships."' The decision does not establish any
absolutist position, but rather takes a far more measured approach,
giving a great deal of discretion to state officials to decide when
intervention is warranted by holding that "the scope of the positive
obligation must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an
impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities."" The
64. Id. 191.
65. Id. IT 192-98.
66. Id. 195.
67. Id. IT 114-17.
68. See, e.g., Tarik Abdel-Monem, Opuz v. Turkey: Europe's Landmark
Judgment on Violence Against Women, 17 No. 1 HuM. RTS. BRIEF 29, 29 (2009);
Patricia Londono, Developing Human Rights Principlesin Cases of Gender-Based
Violence: Opuz v Turkey in the European Court of Human Rights, 9 HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 657, 667 (2009).
69. In particular, the Court relied upon Kontrova v. Slovakia, App. No. 7510/04,
Eur. Ct. H.R. 49 (2007) (holding that right to life also "extends in appropriate
circumstances to a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventative
operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from the criminal
acts of another individual").
70. See, e.g., Airey v. Ireland, App. No. 6289/73, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1979); Regina v.
Brown, (1993) 1 A.C. 212 (Eng. H.L.).
71. Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1129 (2009), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item=l&portal=hbkm&action=html&high
light=opuz%20%7C%20turkey&sessionid=62302790&skin=hudoc-en.
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question of whether the authorities did all that could be reasonably
expected once they knew or should have known of the real and
immediate threat to life "can only be answered in the light of all the
circumstances of any particular case."72 The Court thereby prefers a
pragmatic approach to any political or theoretical concerns about
victim privacy or autonomy.
Of particular usefulness, the Court set forth a list of factors that
authorities should consider in deciding to pursue a prosecution when
faced with a victim's withdrawn complaint:
* The seriousness of the offense
* Whether the victim's injuries are physical or psychological
* If the defendant used a weapon
* If the defendant has made any threats since the attack
* If the defendant planned the attack
* The effect (including psychological) on any children living in
the household
* The chances of the defendant offending again
* The continuing threat to the health and safety of the victim or
anyone else who was, or could become, involved
* The current state of the victim's relationship with the defendant
* The effect on that relationship of continuing with the
prosecution against the victim's wishes
* The history of the relationship, particularly if there had been
any other violence in the past and
* The defendant's criminal history, particularly any previous
violence"
The Court concluded: "It can be inferred from this practice that the
more serious the offence or the greater the risk of further offences,
the more likely that the prosecution should continue in the public
interest, even if victims withdraw their complaints."7 4 This list
provides an excellent starting point for training decision-makers on
the dynamics of abuse and how to access risks on a case-by-case basis.
One criticism of Opuzis that the decision does not go far enough
in setting forth more objective criteria by which to assess whether
72. Id. $130.
73. Id $138.
74. Id. 1139.
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state intervention is mandated. One of the problems with the "Opuz
test," as it were, is that it does not include other risk factors for
intimate partner homicide such as forced sex, extreme jealousy, and
the use of drugs and alcohol." The National Institute of Justice, for
example, has developed an assessment tool based on a review of
women who were killed by their intimate partners. 6 It lists fifteen
factors, and found that women who score eight or higher have a very
grave risk of being murdered." Yet, it also notes that the assessment
is only a guide, not a predictive tool." It also found that almost half
of the women studied did not recognize their high level of risk.7 9
Thus, while Opuz provides a useful starting point for framing the
affirmative duty to undertake a risk assessment in all cases made
known to state authorities, as a practical matter state authorities
should seek out richer and more sophisticated data on how to
evaluate cases.
Finally, the facts of Opuz are "bad" facts in that the violence was
extreme, ongoing, and well-known to the authorities. It involved two
women who suffered severe and documented physical injury, and one
of them was killed. Because these facts are so bad, it would have
been almost unthinkable for the Court to have found that state
authorities were innocent actors. But many domestic violence cases
that end in serious injury or death have not had such a "bad" history.
To that extent, one concern is that state authorities will only
undertake intervention in the most extreme cases using the bad facts
of Opuz as a guide, and may continue policies of nonintervention in
cases that are distinguishable.
III. Opuz and Health as a Human Right
There are three notable aspects of the Opuz decision relative to
the conversation about health as a human right. First, and most
glaringly, the European Convention itself does not include any right
to health, in contrast to the other human rights documents discussed
above. The Court relied on Article 2's Right to Life and Article 3's
75. See Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al., Assessing Risk Factorsfor IntimatePartner
Homicide, 250 NAT'L INST. JUSTICE J. 14 (2003), available at http://www.
ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/jrOO0250e.pdf.
76. Id.
77. Id, at 16.
78. Id,
7 9. Id
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Right to be Free from Torture or Humane or Degrading Treatment
as providing the context for the injuries both of the women suffered.
But, because there was no specific claim to the right to health, the
physical harms suffered by both victims, while detailed in the Court's
opinion, serve as a weak basis for finding that Turkey should have
done more to prevent their physical and psychological harms. Thus,
because of the lack of language in the European Convention as to
health, the Court was hampered in addressing a state's positive
obligation to ensure not just the life of its citizens, but their health as
well. In some respects, it is almost absurd that the Court had to look
to Article 3's ban on torture to find that Turkey had violated Nahide's
human rights. Because she survived the attacks Nahide had no
specific claim under Article 2's Right to Life. Thus, Opuz highlights
why an explicit right to health ought to be a necessary inclusion in all
human rights documents in order to address the real harms suffered
by citizens at the hands of intimate partners. The inclusion of the
right to health may not have changed the outcome of the decision, but
it would have provided the Court with a far more honest and accurate
assessment of the harms that were suffered by both women.
Second, despite any explicit discussion of the right to health, the
Court nevertheless incorporates an affirmative state obligation to at
least consider a victim's health and threats to a victim's health and
safety when deciding whether it should proceed against as abuser.
What is critical about this is that the Court articulates that health is a
critical consideration even if the European Convention does not
specifically provide for such. Therefore, even if states have no
specific obligation to ensure a citizen's health, in the context of
domestic violence, a victim's health, broadly defined as both physical
and psychological, should be a central concern.
Opuz implicitly requires states to train authorities to better
assess domestic violence cases. As part of that training, state
authorities need to understand and account for the broad range of
health consequences discussed in Part I of this article. While bruises
and broken bones are easy to identify and document, reproductive
health issues, chronic ailments, and certain mental consequences are
far harder to detect. In providing guidance on how to identify the
range of health issues and their relevance to state intervention, the
medical profession can be of enormous help to the law.
Finally, and particularly important relative to the question of the
conflict between privacy/autonomy and positive state intervention,
the Opuz Court firmly and unequivocally preferences the latter when

2011]

Health, Human Rights, and Violence Against Women and Girls

147

there is a risk of serious injury or a long-term threat to health and
safety. The Court held that "national authorities' interference with
the private or family life of the individuals might be necessary in
order to protect the health and rights of others or to prevent
commission of criminal acts."a The seriousness of the risk to the
applicant's mother rendered such intervention by the authorities
necessary. Here, the Court rejects any absolutist position and instead
requires the state to undertake an affirmative assessment of risks."
To that end, doing nothing is never an option for the state once it
knows or has reason to know of a serious risk to the physical or
mental health of its citizen. It must assess the situation in every case
that comes to its attention, and that assessment must be meaningful
and include health concerns.
Therefore, while Opuz does not directly create an explicit right
to health in the context of gendered violence, it does give life to such
a concept by articulating a clear standard of positive state
intervention. It also rejects any absolutist position on mandatory
intervention by requiring a case-by-case analysis that accounts for a
victim's health as part of an overall assessment as to whether privacy
concerns must yield to the state's obligations to equally and
affirmatively protect the lives of its citizens from private violence.
Therefore, the importance of Opuz is not just its holding, but its
sophisticated and balanced approach to the complicated dynamics of
state intervention into otherwise private relationships.
IV. Conclusion
I am confident that Professor Leary would view Opuz as a
positive step towards the right to health even though no such specific
language is used the opinion. What is most important are the general
principles of both bodily integrity and equality embodied in the
decision. To that end, Opuz provides a far clearer articulation of a
right to health in the context of gendered violence than any case to
date. Even if states, like the U.S., refuse to recognize such affirmative
state duties, individual jurisdictions can certainly adopt policies that
reflect the principles in Opuz when balancing health and privacy
80. Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. 144 (2009), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&high
light=33401/02&sessionid=61785011&skin=hudoc-en (citing K.A. & A.D. v. Belgium,
App. No. 42758/98 and 45558/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 81 (2005)).
81. Id. 138.
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concerns. By recognizing health concerns as part of a broader agenda
of ending gendered violence, we come closer to alleviating the human
suffering that Professor Leary devoted her life to ending.

